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INTRODUCTION
Economic development requires “political institutions that
credibly commit the state to honor economic and political
rights.” 1 It is widely considered that federalism, or more specifically, interjurisdictional competition, can force local governments to protect property rights. 2 China is a unitary country by
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1. Barry Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: MarketPreserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 1
(1995).
2. See, e.g., Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions:
Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473,
506–11 (1991); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 YALE L.J. 72, 79 (2005); Maureen E. Brady, Penn Central
Squared: What the Many Factors of Murr v. Wisconsin Mean for Property Federalism, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 57, 63 (2017); Robert C. Ellickson, Federalism and Kelo: A Question for Richard Epstein, 44 TULSA L. REV. 751, 757
(2009); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Individual Right to Federalism in the
Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 888, 891–92 (2006); Carol M. Rose,
What Federalism Tells Us About Takings Jurisprudence, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 1681, 1692 (2007); Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting
the Scale of Property Protection, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 883, 887 (2007); Stewart
E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence,
114 YALE L.J. 203, 271 (2004); cf. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism,
and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM.
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virtue of its constitution, but leading scholars believe that its
economic success, which has occurred with neither rule of law
nor democracy, is attributable to a de facto federalist system.3
Most notably, Professor Barry Weingast and his co-authors
coined the term “market-preserving federalism” (MPF) to describe decentralized economic governance and interjurisdictional competition in China.4 MPF scholars have examined the
impact of fiscal federalism, that is, fiscal autonomy and hardbudget constraints for local governments, on China’s economic
development. 5
But does MPF apply to land institutions? Does interjurisdictional competition force local governments to protect land
rights? As Professor Steven Cheung, a pioneer in law and economics, has pointed out, land is the most important asset that
Chinese local governments have to compete with one another
on economic development. 6 Therefore, understanding the relationship between land rights and federalism is central to any
claim that MPF is the political foundation of China’s economic
success. 7 Unfortunately there has been no research on the power allocation and interactions between the central and local
governments on property rights. Even Cheung takes land institutions as a given and does not examine the impact of interjurisdictional competition on the development of land institutions. 8
This Article examines whether federalism protects land
rights in China from two dimensions. I first compare national
& MARY L. REV. 301 (1993). For a critique, see generally Ilya Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 53 (2011).
3. Eric Maskin & Chenggang Xu, Soft Budget Constraint Theories: From
Centralization to the Market, 9 ECON. OF TRANSITION 1, 10–11 (2001); Gabriella Montinola et al., Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China, 48 WORLD POL. 50, 56 (1995); Yingyi Qian & Barry R.
Weingast, Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives, 11 J.
ECON. PERSP. 83, 86–90 (1997); Weingast, supra note 1, at 21–24; Chenggang
Xu, The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development, 49 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 1076, 1105 (2011). For a critique of market-preserving federalism, see generally Hongbin Cai and Daniel Treisman, Did Government Decentralization Cause China’s Economic Miracle?, 58 WORLD POL. 505 (2006);
Jonathan Rodden & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism Preserve Markets?, 83 VA. L. REV. 1521 (1997).
4. See Weingast, supra note 1, at 3.
5. See, e.g., id. at 8; Montinola et al., supra note 3, at 66, 72.
6. See Steven N.S. Cheung, The Economic System of China, 1 MAN &
ECON. 1, 18 (2014) (concerning intercounty competition in China).
7. See Montinola et al., supra note 3, at 51.
8. See generally Cheung, supra note 6.
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law with local institutions of eminent domain, revealing that
local governments take much more land than the national government approves, frequently violating, tweaking, and challenging national law. I next examine the impact of interjurisdictional competition on the development of local land
institutions, demonstrating that local governments are weakening individual land rights for the benefits of mobile capital.
Overall, Chinese federalism weakens rather than strengthens
individual land rights and should be called rights-weakening
federalism.
This China case also has general theoretical implications.
For decades, leading property law scholars in the United States
have debated whether federalism protects land rights but have
achieved no consensus. 9 The existing debate centers around the
immobility of land, 10 however, this Article argues that land
immobility is not an essential factor. The structure and power
of local governance, the balance between land and capital in
particular, matters much more. Hence, the better question to
ask with respect to interjurisdictional competition is who benefits from the competition. This Article also poses a more fundamental challenge to the literature on interjurisdictional competition by adopting agglomeration economics, which poses the
question of whether such competition constitutes sorting or agglomeration. 11 All the existing literature on property rights and
federalism presumes a market of sorting—that investors are
indifferent to location, and are thus attracted by local governments offering the best price or strongest protection. 12 However, urbanization and industrialization in China are actually a
process of agglomeration, which determines that a few cities
with a natural, or at least initial, advantage are taking over,
and the local governments of the remainder will therefore eventually lose in the competition. 13 The implication is that interjurisdictional competition is actually a race to the bottom for
9. See generally supra note 2; see also Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights
Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 149–51 (1992) (discussing
limitations and promising aspects of federalism).
10. See generally Been, supra note 2; Ellickson, supra note 2; Epstein, supra note 9; Somin, supra note 2.
11. For a more thorough explanation of agglomeration economics, see generally MASAHISA FUJITA & JACQUES-FRANÇOIS THISSE, ECONOMICS OF AGGLOMERATION: CITIES, INDUSTRIAL LOCATION, AND GLOBALIZATION (2013) (exploring theories of economic geography and urban economics that concern
differing concentrations of economic activity around the world).
12. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part II.C.
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most local governments rather than a win-win game as the
sorting literature suggests.
The Article is structured as follows. Part I examines the allocation of power regarding land institutions between national
law and local laws and finds that local governments fail to honor national laws on property rights protection. It also explores
the sources of local power in China’s authoritarian regime and
identifies the patterns of national-local interactions reflected in
different forms of illegal local practices. Part II then evaluates
whether competition matters for land rights, arguing that land
immobility is not the key factor and, hence, that the focus
should be the nature of competition and whose interests are
served. Part III concludes with a reflection on the paradoxical
nature of authoritarian federalism and possible directions for
reform, thereby setting an agenda for future work.
I. WHO IS THE GUARDIAN? NATIONAL LAW VERSUS
ILLEGAL TAKINGS
After Kelo v. City of New London, 14 many state and local
governments in the United States voluntarily committed to not
pursuing eminent domain for the purpose of economic development. 15 Professor Ellickson takes this as evidence of “federalism at work,” that is, local governments constraining themselves from abusing property rights under the pressure of
interjurisdictional competition, and further argues that a decision or baseline need not be delineated at the national level. 16
Professors Epstein and Somin disagree that interjurisdictional
competition provides adequate protection for immobile assets.17
The two parties disagree upon whether local governments provide better or the same property rights protection than the federal government, 18 but neither worries about the possibility
14. 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (holding that although a sovereign generally may
not assert its eminent domain power to effectuate a transfer of property from
one private party to another, it may constitutionally do so where it is part of
an economic development plan which serves the public purpose, even if the
condemned property would not eventually be open to the public).
15. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 2, at 763. See generally Ilya Somin, The
Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 2100 (2009) (describing the “massive backlash” against Kelo by state legislatures enacting anti-eminent domain laws).
16. Ellickson, supra note 2, at 762.
17. Compare Epstein, supra note 9, at 150 (describing competition as “the
great virtue of federalism”), with Somin, supra note 2, at 57–66 (arguing that
competitive federalism provides insufficient protection for property rights).
18. See supra note 17.
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that local governments can be worse than the federal government at protecting property rights. The aforementioned disagreement concerns only whether local governments’ decisions to
constrain their own power of eminent domain after Kelo are
nominal or substantive. 19 Think about the opposite situation:
had the Supreme Court decided in Kelo that local governments
could not take property from one private party and transfer it
to another even for the purpose of economic development, local
governments’ eminent domain power would have been severely
constrained. Would such constraint be effective, however?
The boundary between national and local power is tricky to
identify. Scholars have documented encroachment from both
directions in the United States: backdoor federalization, in
which federal power expands to an arena originally belonging
to a state or local government; 20 and uncooperative federalism,
in which state or local governments encroach upon federal jurisdiction over particular issues. 21 Both the federal and state
governments can contest their jurisdictions, and the boundaries
are often blurry. In a centralized, authoritarian country such as
China, however, the boundaries seem at first glance to be
clearer cut. All power stems from the national authority, which
decides what local governments can and cannot do. In the specific context of takings, the national law establishes a system of
top-down control combined with quotas specifying how much
land a local government can take. 22 Nevertheless, local governments do rebel. Many of their takings decisions clearly violate national law and are, therefore, illegal. 23
Illegal takings constitute clear evidence that local governments in China take more land than national law allows. This
is markedly different from United States state and local governments instituting higher standards constraining themselves
from exercising eminent domain power in the post-Kelo backlash. 24 In other words, in China national law and the national
authority have established a baseline and quotas for eminent
19. See Ellickson, supra note 2, at 761–63; Somin, supra note 15, at 2154.
20. See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1353–58 (2006).
21. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1271 (2008).
22. See Shitong Qiao, The Politics of Chinese Land: Partial Reform, Vested
Interests, and Small Property, 29 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 70, 98–102 (2015).
23. See infra Part I.C.1.
24. See Somin, supra note 15, at 2114–48.
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domain that local governments clearly encroach upon. 25 Accordingly, local governments provide weaker property rights protection than the national authority. However, it seems counterintuitive that local governments in such a centralized,
authoritarian regime could encroach upon the national authority on such a phenomenal scale. Compared with the national authority in a federalist system such as the United States, an authoritarian regime such as China is expected to exercise
stricter control over local authorities, which are expected in
turn to behave like “servants” serving only one “master.”26 An
important question is thus where local governments’ power
comes from. How can they operate contrary to national law? If,
in a federalist and democratic country, we see contest and tension within the system as a checks-and-balances mechanism,
then how should we view the illegal behaviors of local governments in an authoritarian regime? Related to the foregoing issues is whether there is any variation in illegality in the conflicts between national and local authorities in China and, if so,
what it tells us.
This Part lays out a dynamic system describing the interactions between national and local authorities in China’s authoritarian regime. The system is interesting in that, on the
one hand, there seems to be a clear and simple boundary between the two sets of authorities, while, on the other, local governments appear to hold the power to break national laws and
encroach upon the national authority. Moreover, the different
ways in which local authorities depart from national law, as reflected in a taxonomy of illegality, exert differing impacts on
the national and local agendas. Section A introduces the national law of eminent domain; Section B analyzes the sources of
local power; and Section C presents a taxonomy of illegality and
discusses the different central-local dynamics under each category of illegality.
A. PROPERTY AS NATIONAL LAW
Property law does not have to be national, and in many
countries is not.27 However, China’s unitary system applies to
25. See infra Part I.C.1.
26. Cf. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 21, at 1265–71 (describing
the ways state and local governments are subservient to the national government).
27. See, e.g., Serkin, supra note 2 (proposing a system allowing local governments to choose what kind of property regime to have).
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every area of law, including property law. 28 The Chinese property law system is comprised of the Constitution, Law on Legislation (LOL), Property Law (PL), 29 Land Administration Law
(LAL), Rural Land Contract Law, and Urban Real Estate Administration Law, through which the division of power between
the central and local authorities regarding land administration
and rights is defined. 30 Beyond the specific division of power
are two general principles. The first is contained in article 8 of
the LOL, which defines the exclusive authority of the national
legislature—the National People’s Congress and its Standing
Committee—including the authority to regulate the expropriation of private property and basic civil law institutions.31 The
second is the numerus clausus principle, instituted by article 5
of the PL, which states that “[t]he categories and contents of
property rights shall be stipulated by law.” 32 Again, this principle gives exclusive authority to the national legislature to define and regulate the categories and contents of property
rights. 33 These two principles together determine the exclusive
28. See XIANFA art. 3 (2004) (China) (emphasizing the centralized leadership of the national authority).
29. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wuquan Fa (中华人民共和国物权法)
[Property Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), http://
www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471118.htm (China).
30. See, e.g., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengshi Fangdichan Guanli
Fa (中华人民共和国城市房地产管理法) [Urban Real Estate Administration Law]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995, amended on Aug. 30, 2007 and Aug. 27, 2009), arts. 7, 11, 12,
14 (China).
31. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifa Fa (中华人民共和国立法法)
[Law on Legislation] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000), art. 8 (China) (“ The following
matters shall only be governed by laws: . . . (7) Expropriation and requisition
of property not owned by the state; (8) The basic system of civil matters . . . .” (author’s translation)).
32. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wuquan Fa (中华人民共和国物权法)
[Property Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), art. 5
(China).
33. The National People’s Congress (and in certain situations, its Standing Committee), can make laws (法律), XIANFA arts. 58, 62 (1982) (China), as
opposed to administrative regulations, which are made by the State Council
(行政法规), departmental regulations, which are made by departments of the
State Council (部门规章), and local regulations, which are made by local people’s congresses (地方性法规). See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifa Fa (中华
人民共和国立法法) [Law on Legislation] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000), arts. 7, 65, 72, 80
(China).
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authority of national legislation in regulating property rights.
Two considerations underpin this institutional design. First,
affording local authorities and various government agencies the
power to make rules concerning property rights would likely
impose an overly high information cost that would jeopardize
national unification and the common market.34 The second consideration is the potential power abuses by other authorities,
including local authorities. Only the national legislature can
serve as the guardian of property rights, a basic citizen right
sanctioned by the constitution. 35 In addition, the LAL also institutes a top-down control system for land expropriation.36 According to that law, the expropriation of agricultural land must
satisfy three requirements: (1) consistency with the land use
plan; (2) approval for its conversion to construction land; and
(3) land expropriation approval from the provincial-level government or State Council. 37 The national government is in
charge of making annual land use plans, which specify the
amount of land to be expropriated and allocate expropriation
quotas to local governments. 38
B. LOCAL POWER IN AN AUTHORITARIAN COUNTRY: WHERE
DOES IT COME FROM?
Local power in China arises from two sources. The first I
refer to as the power of numbers: the sheer size of the country
and its numerous subnational units make it costly, if not impossible, for the central authority to monitor local governments.
The second can be called “the power of the servant”: the integration of and interdependence between the national and local
authorities entitle the latter to a say in the decision-making
process and afford them a louder voice in the system. 39

34. Liang Huixing (梁慧星), (是物权法定还是物权自由) [Numerus Clausus
or Numerus Apertus?], (人民法院报) [PEOPLE’S COURT DAILY] (Nov. 20, 2006),
http://www.iolaw.org.cn/showarticle.asp?id=1974.
35. Id.
36. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudi Guanli (中华人民共和国土地管
理法) [Land Administration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., June 25, 1986, amended on Aug. 29, 1998 and Aug. 28, 2004),
arts. 44–45, 52, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_
1383939.htm (China).
37. Id.
38. See id. arts. 4, 18, 21, 43–45.
39. See Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down,
124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 35–40 (2010).
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More than three thousand city- and county-level governments in China conduct the daily management of and exercise
control over the land within their jurisdictions, either within or
beyond national government authorization. 40 Hayek argued
that local information is key to understanding whether production should be centralized or decentralized. 41 A recent American Economic Review article reveals that information costs determine whether the Chinese national government retains or
relinquishes control over state-owned enterprises. 42 The same
logic applies to state land ownership. Information costs are the
main reason for the Chinese national government’s failure to
compete with local governments over control of the land. 43 The
sheer number of local-government units makes direct control by
the national government infeasible. 44 The national government
has tried to strengthen its control over land by setting up regional land-monitoring offices, separate from local governments.45 Nevertheless, if we compare the number of Ministry of
Land and Resources (MLR) employees with the total number of
land-administration staff employed by over three thousand local governments, the former is but a tiny fraction of the latter. 46 As a result, the national government has even been
forced to give up its share of land-sale revenue. 47
40. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, through 2015,
there were 334 city-level and 2850 county-level administrative regions in China. See NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA (中华人民共和国国家统计局),
CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK § 1-1 (中国统计年鉴) (2016), http://www.stats
.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexch.htm.
41. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519,
524–26 (1945).
42. See generally Zhangkai Huang et al., Hayek, Local Information, and
Commanding Heights: Decentralizing State-Owned Enterprises in China,
107 AM. ECON. REV. 2455 (2017) (explaining that lower information costs tend
to lead to less decentralization, and vice versa).
43. See id. at 2456.
44. See id.
45. For example, in 2006 the State Council approved the establishment of
nine land-supervising offices across the country, aiming at supervising the
land administration of local governments. See Guowuyuan Bangongting
Guanyu Jianli Guojia Tudi Ducha Zhidu Youguan Wenti de Tongzhi (国务院办
公厅关于建立国家土地督察制度有关问题的通知) [Notice of the State Council Office on the Establishment of the National Land Supervision Institution]
(promulgated by State Council Office No. 50, July 13, 2006, effective July 13,
2006) (China).
46. This can be shown by comparing the number of local administrative
regions, and thus the number of land-administration offices all around the
country, with the central-government level, where there is only one Department of Land Resource. See NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, supra
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Judged by population and the amount of land within their
respective jurisdictions, Chinese provinces are comparable to
many European countries, and tend to be too large as economic
development units, whereas townships tend to be too small. 48
Cities and counties, in contrast, tend to be of an efficient scale
for economic management. 49 In China’s economic reform process, cities and counties have thus become the administrative
units that actually manage the economy. 50 Because land is the
main instrument for financing and promoting economic development in the Chinese case, 51 city and county governments
cannot manage the economy without effective daily control over
land. In other words, the allocation of power over land matches
the allocation of power over the economy. In this sense, Chinese
local governments are no different from their counterparts in
the United States. The second source of local power, what Professor Gerken dubs the power of the servant, 52 is often neglected.
The local governments in centralized, authoritarian regimes are supposed to be weaker than their counterparts in
federal, democratic regimes in which local authorities enjoy legitimacy from the bottom up, as well as inherent independence
and autonomy from the federal government. 53 However, being
part of the national government can be an advantage. Because
their membership in the national community is taken for
granted, as there is no separation between national and local
authorities, local authorities can legitimately claim entitlement
to be part of the national decision-making process. Local governments are therefore inherently endowed with the power and
note 40, at § 1-1 (listing the divisions of administrative areas in China).
47. See Qiao, supra note 22, at 82.
48. See Cheung, supra note 6, at 18–19.
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. See, e.g., Xuejun Du (杜雪君) & Zhonghua Huang (黄忠华), Yi Di Mou
Fazhan: Tudi Churang yu Jingji Zengzhang de Shizheng Yanjiu (以地谋发展：
土地出让与经济增长的实证研究) [Land forDevelopment: An Empirical Study of
Urban Land Supply and Economic Growth], 7 (中国土地科学) [CHN. LAND SCI.]
40, 40–47 (2015); Yonggang Li (李勇刚) & Shijie Zhang (张士杰), Jinsheng Jili,
Tudi Caizheng yu Jingji Zengzhang Jixiao- Jiyu Zhongbu Liusheng de Mianban Shuju (晋升激励、土地财政与经济增长绩效——基于中部六省的面板数据)
[Promotion Incentives, Land Finance and the Efficiency of Economic Growth—
Based on the Panel Data of Six Central Provinces], vol. 31, no. 4 JINGJI
JINGWEI (经济经纬) [ECON. SURVEY] 116, 116–21 (2014).
52. Gerken, supra note 39, at 35–40.
53. Id.
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legitimacy to fulfill national policy goals, which from time to
time supersede the constraints imposed by national law. In
other words, local governments are national governance insiders and have a voice in shaping the national legal and policy
agenda. City and county governments constitute a formidable
interest group in national politics and legislation in China.
They are represented directly in the national legislature and its
highest political body, and many of their leaders are already
national politicians, as is the case of the leaders of Beijing and
Shanghai, or potential leaders with a promising national political career ahead. 54 This situation adds a national perspective to
the daily operation of Chinese local governments. As a result,
the power of the servant can be much stronger, more prevalent,
and more effective in China than in federal systems. Local governments have a choice as to whether they activate their role
as national-government servants. They sometimes play that
role to suit local needs, and sometimes with a true national
agenda in mind. 55 The latter is particularly true for cities with
a prominent status in the national system or whose leaders
have national political ambitions. 56
C. TAXONOMY OF ILLEGALITY
The illegality of local actions, or the conflicts between national law and local institutions, can take different forms, as
measured by the tradeoff between the risk of exposure and a
local authority’s claim of legitimacy: the more a local authority
seeks legitimacy from a local decision’s national impact, the
less likely it is to avoid attention, monitoring, and supervision
by the national authority. Conversely, the more a local authority defines its decision in purely local terms, the less national
attention that decision is likely to draw. A local government
can choose to: (1) operate under the national radar, that is, do
54. Leaders of Beijing and Shanghai are often also members of the Political Bureau—or Politburo—of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of China (CPC), which consists of the top twenty-five national political elites.
See, e.g., Cheng Li, China’s New Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee,
BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/interactives/
chinas-new-politburo-standing-committee (providing profiles of the current
Politburo members, including party secretaries of Beijing and Shanghai). For
example, the current leader of Beijing, Cai Qi, is a member of the Politburo.
See Yamei, Cai Qi – Member of Political Bureau of CPC Central Committee,
XINHUA (Oct. 25, 2017), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/25/c_
136705690.htm.
55. See infra, Part II.C.
56. Id.
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what it likes in the hope that the inconsistency of its behavior
with national law will not be exposed; (2) tweak 57 the law to
suit its needs without openly challenging it; or (3) openly challenge a particular national law by going beyond it, often invoking a national agenda or higher law, such as the Constitution.
All three choices create inconsistencies between national law
and local institutions, and are thus clearly illegal in a technical
sense in a centralized, authoritarian country such as China,
but they have different implications. The surprising discovery
of the current research is that even under the current authoritarian regime in China, local governments’ best strategy is often to go beyond the law, either from the perspective of its own
interests or with the aim of institutional improvement.
1. Under the Radar
Flagrantly illegal behavior often hides under the radar of
legal enforcement, for example, when local governments take
land from farmers without authorization. This type of illegal
taking is different from tweaking the law in the sense that the
local governments involved do not try to justify their expropriation actions or claim that they are legal. At the same time,
however, they do not challenge the national eminent domain
system by appealing to higher laws or goals. Instead, they accept the legitimacy of the current system and their own illegality, and simply hope to get by without being discovered or publicized.
Since the revision of the LAL in 1998, local governments in
China have faced increasingly stringent institutional constraints imposed by the central authority in the land expropriation arena. 58 Although local governments enjoy eminent do-

57. Cf. Gerken, supra note 39, at 46.
58. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudi Guanli Fa (中华人民共和国土
地管理法) [Land Administration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., June 25, 1986, amended on Aug. 29, 1998 and Aug. 28,
2004) (China); the 2004 Constitutional Amendment, Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Xianfa Xiuzheng An (中华人民共和国宪法修正案) [Amendments to
the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l
People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 2004, effective Mar. 14, 2004) (China); Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Wuquan Fa (中华人民共和国物权法) [Property Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.npc.gov.cn/
englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471118.htm (China); Guoyou tudi shang
fangwu zhengshou yu buchang tiaoli (国有土地上房屋征收与补偿条例) [Regulation on the Expropriation of Buildings on State-owned Land and Compensa-
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main power to expropriate rural land and convert it into urban
construction land, that power is limited in several ways, most
importantly by the centralized land-use quota system. 59 Another limit is the top-down approval system determining that any
taking without proper authorization is illegal. 60 The MLR can
use satellites to monitor land-use changes on the ground and
theoretically can find out how much land has been illegally
taken and where. 61 Even equipped with such a convenient
technology, however, legal enforcement by the MLR can only
control, not eliminate, illegal takings.
According to MLR data, between 2005 and 2015, local governments annually appropriated land in the range of 10,000 to
50,000 hectares without authorization. 62 Considering that Chinese farmers own on average 0.09 hectares, 63 local governments took land away from 100,000 to 500,000 farmers every
year, in violation of national land use law and quotas.
2. Tweaking the Law
A national and centralized legal system is often more
fragmented and layered than it is centralized and unified. National land law in China comprises not only the national PL,
but also the LAL, an eminent domain ordinance, and a number
tion] (promulgated by the State Council, Jan. 21, 2011, effective Jan. 21, 2011)
(China).
59. Difang Zhengfu Suku Yongdi Zhibiao Buzu Guotubu Fouren Chen Bu
Quedi (地方政府诉苦用地指标不足 国土部否认称不缺地) [Local Government
Complains Lack of Land Use Quota While Department of Land Resource Denied], FIRST FIN. DAILY (第一财经日报) (Jan. 11, 2011), http://business.sohu
.com/20110111/n278788848.shtml (discussing government plans to reform the
use of quotas).
60. Hayek, supra note 41, at 524 (discussing the advantages of central
planners leaving some decisions to the “man on the spot”).
61. See, e.g., Guotu Ziyuanbu Guanyu Kaizhan 2016 Niandu Tudi
Kuangchan Weipian Zhifa Jiandu Jiancha Gongzuo de Tongzhi (国土资源部关
于开展 2016 年度土地矿产卫片执法监督检查工作的通知) [Notice on Legal Enforcement, Supervising and Monitoring Work through Satellite Pictures in
2016], MINISTRY OF LAND AND RES. OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (中华
人 民 共 和 国 国 土 资 源 部 ), http://www.mlr.gov.cn/zwgk/zytz/201612/t20161206_
1423514.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2017).
62. Original Data from Guotu Ziyuan Bu (国土资源部) [Ministry of Land and
Resources], Zhongguo Guotu Ziyuan Nianjian (中国国土资源统计年鉴) [China
Land and Resources Statistical Yearbook] 2006–2016.
63. Zhan Yan, China Seeks a Balance Between Food Security and Urbanization, PERMANENT MISSION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO THE
U.N. (Sept. 17, 2008), http://www.china-un.org/eng/zt/nationalday2008/
t513215.htm.
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of more specific laws serving various functions. 64 These multiple laws and ordinances address different aspects of land institutions while sharing similar goals, concepts, and frameworks,
but they also represent tension, conflict, and inconsistency
within the legal system. Such a complicated system affords local governments leeway for manipulation and tweaking. When
local governments tweak various parts of the national legal
system, their law-breaking intention is less clear than when
they choose to act under the national authority’s radar, in
which case they clearly know that they are violating the law. In
the case of tweaking, however, regardless of legality or illegality, local governments at the very least know that their actions
are inconsistent with national practice. Because their tweaking
of the law can be attributed in part to the ambiguity or inconsistency of national law, though, they can claim more legitimacy for that behavior than for flagrant illegality. However, lawtweaking is defensive rather than offensive in seeking legitimacy from the higher law or the national policy agenda. The local
governments that take on such action often have no clear national agenda, but are seeking only to find national legal basis
for their local agendas.
The following is a good example. In 2011, after the State
Council promulgated the Regulations on Expropriation of
Houses on State-Owned Land (the “2011 Regulations”), 65 local
governments across the country formulated implementary regulations. 66 Although some of these local regulations were pure64. These specific laws include the Urban Real Estate Administration
Law, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengshi Fangdichan Guanli Fa (中华人
民共和国城市房地产管理法) [Urban Real Estate Administration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1994, effective Jan.
1, 1995, amended on Aug. 30, 2007 and Aug. 27, 2009) (China), and the Rural
Land Contract Law, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Nongcun Tudi Chengbao
Fa (中华人民共和国农村土地承包法) [Rural Land Contract Law] (promulgated
by the Nat’l People’s Cong. Standing Comm., Aug. 29, 2002, effective Mar. 1,
2003) (China).
65. Guoyou Tudi shang Fangwu Zhengshou yu Buchang Tiaoli (国有土地
上房屋征收与补偿条例) [Regulation on the Expropriation of Buildings on Stateowned Land and Compensation] (promulgated by the State Council, Jan. 21,
2011, effective Jan. 21, 2011) (China).
66. For example, on October 19, 2011, the Shanghai City Government issued its Implementation Regulations on the Expropriation of Buildings on
State-Owned Land and Compensation in Shanghai. Shanghaishi Guoyou Tudi
Shang Fangwu Zhengshou yu Buchang Shishi Xize (《上海市国有土地上房屋征
收与补偿实施细则》) [Implementation Regulations on the Expropriation of
Buildings on State-Owned Land and Compensation in Shanghai] (promulgated by the Shanghai Municipal People’s Gov., Oct. 19, 2011, effective Oct. 19,
2011) (China). On November 13, 2011, the Gansu Province Government issued
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ly implementary in nature, some created new rules that deviated from or even jeopardized the national regulations. For example, Wuhan, a leading city in central China, introduced a
two-part clause designed to simplify the expropriation procedure and weaken the bargaining power of potential hold-out
owners. 67 The first part of the clause copied article 13 of the
2011 Regulations, whereas the second part granted local landadministration agencies the direct power to revoke individual
land-rights certificates in accordance with expropriation decisions.68 In other words, land-rights holders within the area designated for expropriation would lose their property rights the
moment the government issued its eminent domain decisions—
prior to any negotiation between the condemnor and the condemnee. In one publicly reported occurrence, the Wuhan government had revoked more than three hundred land-use rights
(LUR) certificates through a notice on its website and then broken into houses that had lost their valid LUR certificates to
force the occupants’ eviction. 69 The second part of the clause
appears to be a straightforward application of article 28 of the
PL, which stipulates that a change in property rights takes effect the moment that expropriation or judicial decisions or arbiits Several Regulations on the Implementation of the “Regulation on the Expropriation of Buildings on State-owned Land and Compensation” in Gansu.
Gansu sheng Shishi Guoyou Tudi Shang Fangwu Zhengshou yu Buchang
Tiaoli Ruogan Guiding (甘肃省实施《国有土地上房屋征收与补偿条例》若干规定)
[Several Regulations on the Implementation of the “Regulation on the Expropriation of Buildings on State-owned Land and Compensation” in Gansu]
(promulgated by Gansu Provincial People’s Gov., Nov. 13, 2011, effective Jan.
1, 2012) (China). After the issuance of Order No. 590, according to original legal research conducted by the author on a database compiled by Peking University, as of October 28, 2017, more than three hundred implementation documents have been issued across the country, including nine local regulations
(地方性法规), thirty-two local government rules (地方政府规章), two hundred
eighty-four local regulatory documents (地方性文件), three local judicial documents (地方司法文件), and two local working documents (地方工作文件).
67. Wuhan Shi Guoyou Tudi Shang Fangwu Zhengshou yu Buchang Shishi Banfa (武汉市国有土地上房屋征收与补偿实施办法 武汉市人民政府令第 234
号 ) [Implementation Regulations on Expropriation of Buildings on Stateowned Land and Compensation in Wuhan City] (promulgated by the Wuhan
City Gov., Oct. 13, 2016, effective Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.wpl.gov.cn/pc-361
-101899.html (China).
68. Id.
69. Xuan Hua (滑璇) & Luxiao Wang (王露晓), (公告一出，产权证作废? 武
汉汉阳注销 330 拆迁户不动产证引争议) [Property Rights Certificate Invalidated
Once Expropriation Notice Issued? The Revocation of 330 LUR Certificates
Gives Rise to Disputes], NANFANG ZHOUMO (南方周末) [S. WKLY.] (Jan. 20,
2017), http://www.infzm.com/content/122445.
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tration awards take effect. 70 The problem is that the term expropriation decision in the PL, which was passed in 2007, refers to the entire expropriation process, and thus differs from
the term’s use in the 2011 Regulations, which distinguish between expropriation decisions and compensation decisions,
with the former only initiating the expropriation process. 71 The
2011 Regulations also specify which procedures a local government should follow in conducting expropriation, procedures the
Wuhan city government intentionally evaded by referring to
the earlier PL.72
3. Beyond the Law: Can a City Government Interpret the
Constitution?
When a local government chooses to go beyond the law and
seek legitimacy from higher laws or policy goals, it is acting
flagrantly illegally, albeit while making a claim for legitimacy.
Doing so more bluntly manipulates rather than tweaks the law,
as well as more severely encroaches the national authority,
which alone has the power to define higher laws such as the
constitution and set the national policy agendas. 73 Nevertheless,
even in a centralized, authoritarian country such as China, local governments refer to higher laws or national agendas from
time to time to justify practices that deviate from national laws.
Such high-profile illegality may simply be a byproduct of local
government leaders’ economic development efforts, or may have
70. Article 28 of the Property Law stipulates that: “Where a real right is
created, changed, transferred or eliminated for a legal document of the people’s court or arbitration commission or a requisition decision of the people’s
government, etc, the real right shall become effective upon the effectiveness of
the legal document or the expropriation decision of the people’s court.” Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wuquan Fa (中华人民共和国物权法) [Property Law of
the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.npc.gov.cn/
englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471118.htm (China).
71. Compare expropriation decision in article 28 of the Property Law of
the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国物权法), id. 28, with expropriation decisions in chapters two and three of the 2011 Regulations,
Guoyou tudi shang fangwu zhengshou yu buchang tiaoli (国有土地上房屋征收
与补偿条例) [Regulation on the Expropriation of Buildings on State-owned
Land and Compensation] (promulgated by the State Council, Jan. 21, 2011,
effective Jan. 21, 2011) (China).
72. See Guoyou tudi shang fangwu zhengshou yu buchang tiaoli (国有土地
上房屋征收与补偿条例) [Regulation on the Expropriation of Buildings on Stateowned Land and Compensation] (promulgated by the State Council, Jan. 21,
2011, effective Jan. 21, 2011), ch. 2 (China).
73. QIANFAN ZHANG, THE CONSTITUTION OF CHINA: A CONTEXTUAL
ANALYSIS 84–96 (2012).
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a clear agenda to establish a national model. In any event, local
governments’ illegalities spur national dialogue and debates,
and often exert lasting impact nationwide. For example, the
Shenzhen city government interpreted the PRC Constitution in
an idiosyncratic manner to serve its own industrial development, providing a good case for illustrating how local governments go beyond the law to design their own land institutions
and rules. 74 In 2003, the Shenzhen city government initiated
what it called the “land nationalization after urbanization” (城
市化转地) campaign.75 It declared that Shenzhen had completed
the urbanization process to become the first city in China without agriculture or farmers. 76
Accordingly, all land within its jurisdiction should be stateowned pursuant to article 10 of the PRC Constitution, which
states that “urban land is state-owned.” 77 It therefore followed
that the Shenzhen city government could take all land previously owned by villagers without implementing any eminent
domain procedures because it was not exercising eminent domain but rather state land ownership. Shenzhen’s land nationalization constituted a serious encroachment of villagers’ land
rights. It also constituted an intentional misinterpretation of
the PRC Constitution and LAL to circumvent the increasingly
strict land expropriation approval procedure implemented by
the central government. In its one-year campaign, the Shenzhen city government took over 594 square kilometers of land
from roughly 300,000 indigenous villagers in the name of land
nationalization. 78 Its motivation was to grab land from farmers
to supply to industrial investors.79 The Shenzhen city government managed to complete its land nationalization before the
MLR could stop it, although the MLR publicly declared afterwards that “this practice in Shenzhen cannot serve as a precedent” (深圳做法，下不为例). 80 The MLR was right to be concerned about the potential precedent effect, as quite a number
of other cities and counties followed suit by converting farmers

74. See SHITONG QIAO, CHINESE SMALL PROPERTY: THE CO-EVOLUTION OF
LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 138–42 (2017).
75. Id. at 138.
76. Id.
77. XIANFA art. 10 (2004) (China).
78. QIAO, supra note 74, at 138–39.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 139.
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into urban residents and declaring their land urbanized and
therefore owned by the state. 81
II. DOES COMPETITION MATTER FOR LAND RIGHTS?
The concept of competitive federalism argues that interjurisdictional competition curbs property rights abuses by local
governments. 82 It originates from Charles Tiebout’s classic article A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, which posits that
“[i]f consumer-voters are fully mobile, the appropriate local
governments, whose revenue-expenditure patterns are set, are
adopted by the consumer-voters.” 83 In other words, “local government represents a sector where the allocation of public
goods . . . need not take a back seat to the private sector.” 84
Property protection is a form of public good, the value of which
can be capitalized into markets. But land is immobile and it
seems that land rights holders would not be able to vote by foot.
If that is the case, do local governments still compete on land
rights protection? What are they competing for? What is the
nature of the interjurisdictional competition?
A. LAND IMMOBILITY IS NOT THE PROBLEM!
Leading scholars contend that competitive federalism is
unlikely to provide effective protection for property rights in
land because property is an immobile asset. 85 Professor Somin,
for example, argues that people who vote with their feet by
leaving a jurisdiction cannot take their land with them.86 For
this reason, interjurisdictional competition is unlikely to protect property rights in land effectively, although it may prove
more useful in the case of rights to mobile property. Professor
Epstein further argues that “[t]he first weakness of the exit
right under the federalist system concerns cases with specific
81. Id.
82. Somin, supra note 2, at 54.
83. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416, 424 (1956).
84. Id.
85. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 2, at 78 (arguing that because
real property is immobile, it is excluded from some of the benefits of federalism); Epstein, supra note 9, at 155–57 (explaining the difficulty for landowners
and developers of abandoning a project because they are tied to the location);
Somin, supra note 2, at 54 (arguing competitive federalism is unlikely to provide effective protection for property rights in land because property is an immobile asset).
86. Somin, supra note 2, at 54.
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assets tied to a single jurisdiction,” and also that “the landowner is tied to the location, and so long as the political forces are
aligned against him—nothing can stop the losses.” 87 Professors
Bell and Parchomovsky claim that “relocation costs are a distortion of the market for property forms.” 88 They propose allowing the residents of one state to choose property forms in other
jurisdictions without relocating to promote interjurisdictional
competition on property rights protection. 89 Professor Ellickson
acknowledges that the immobility of land reduces the political
pressure on states and cities to treat landowners fairly, but
concludes that interjurisdictional competition still works for
two reasons.90 First, governmental abuse of property rights in a
given jurisdiction lowers property values across the jurisdiction,
which affects politically advantaged and disadvantaged citizens
alike. 91 Second, in addition to land, landowners also own other
more mobile assets that governments do not wish to lose to
neighboring jurisdictions. 92
If we place this federalism debate into a broader context
and trace it back to the areas of corporate governance and environmental regulation from which the debate both originated
and has sparked several generations of discussions, 93 we can
more clearly examine whether land institutions differ from corporate governance or environmental regulation. Land is actually not as separable or different from a corporation or a factory
as it might at first appear; the distinction between mobile and
immobile property is not as clear as it looks. Corporate governance provides a perfect example for interjurisdictional competition because corporations can change their registration situs at
very low cost, whereas environmental law and property law dif87. Epstein, supra note 9, at 155–56.
88. Bell and Parchomovsky, supra note 2, at 102.
89. Id.
90. Ellickson, supra note 2, at 762 n.66.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See generally Marcel Kahan, The State of State Competition for Incorporations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE
(Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2015) (examining the desirability
of federal corporate law as an alternative to the law of the firm’s state of incorporation); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism,
95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 599–613 (1996) (reviewing the environmental federalism debate); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-To-The-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (arguing for state rather than federal
environmental regulation).
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fer in the sense that the costs of moving operations from one jurisdiction to another to escape overly stringent environmental
or property regulations are much higher.94 However, it is just a
matter of degree. Relocation always involves replacing something in a given jurisdiction, be it land, employees, pensions,
etcetera, with something in another jurisdiction. Relocation
costs are universal across the areas of corporate governance,
environmental regulations, and property institutions. Local
governments do have the power to make the exercise of the
right to exit costly, be it corporations, factories, or a plot of
land.95 A city government can simply delimit a date by which
all property, regardless of movable or immovable, within its jurisdiction is subject to the regulation in question. It is not feasible to simply relocate a targeted property to avoid such regulatory costs, even if it is mobile. The idea that somebody can
simply relocate his or her property, which can be a plot of land,
a factory, or a corporation, after a particular regulation or decision has been passed is fanciful, and could be illegal if the
property were targeted by the government. The question then
is whether local governments would impose such costs or prohibition on corporations, investors, or landowners.
There are two risks for local governments: existing residents will flee and potential residents will not come. What matters most is the future and therefore the second risk: the deterrence of potential residents and investors. Even a city leader
with a term lasting only a couple of years will consider not only
the corporations or residents already in his or her jurisdiction
but also potential corporations or residents deciding where to
locate.96 It is reputational costs rather than the immediate loss
of existing residents or corporations that constrain local governments from abusing corporations or residents. Immobility is
not a substantive issue if we adopt a temporal perspective or
view property protection as a sequential game in which potential investors consider how local governments treat existing investors. There is a potential chilling effect that a local leader
94. See Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, supra note 2, at 97–98, 104.
95. Chinese local governments have a tendency of local protectionism,
which hinders the free moving of corporations across the country. See Rodden
& Rose-Ackerman, supra note 3, at 1547–55 (discussing how local governments in China have an incentive to limit imports, monopolize sale, and tax
exports); see also Bai Chong-En et al., “Local Protectionism and Regional Specialization: Evidence from China’s Industries,” 63 J. OF INT’L ECON. 397 (2004)
(researching regional specialization and local protectionism in China).
96. Cheung, supra note 6, at 28.

2018]

RIGHTS-WEAKENING FEDERALISM

1691

with a reasonable time horizon will take into consideration.97
That is why Chinese local governments dare not confiscate investment, a large part of which—such as factories—is actually
immobile.
B. WHAT ARE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS COMPETING FOR?
Interjurisdictional competition in China clearly promotes
economic development, primarily via local governments’ expropriation of resources, mainly land, from less-productive sectors,
such as agriculture, and distributing them to more-productive
industrial sectors. 98 Government intervention reduces the
transaction costs for investors, 99 and even provides protection
for investment in the face of competitive pressure. What has
been largely ignored, however, is the impact of such intervention on individual rights to less-productive property. The downside of prioritizing economic development is the downgrading—
and even sacrifice—of individual rights if they conflict with development goals.
Professors Acemoglu and Robinson argue, in Why Nations
Fail, that China does not adequately protect property rights
and therefore its economic growth is unsustainable. 100 Many
economists would argue, however, that local governments in
China provide a decent level of investment protection. 101 Acemoglu and Robinson’s argument is based on the study of the
Tieben case, in which the owner of Tieben steel company lost
its investment due to the change of policy. 102 However, even in
this case, the Changzhou city government protected and fully
supported the company and suffered together with its owner

97. See Wan Jiang (万江), Zhongguo de Difang Fazhi Jianshe Jingzheng
(中国的地方法治建设竞争) [Legal Competition within Local Governments in
China], 25 (中外法学) [PEKING U. L.J.] 817, 824–27 (2013).
98. See Shitong Qiao & Frank K. Upham, China’s Changing Property Law
Landscape, in COMPARATIVE PROPERTY LAW: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 311, 311–
32 (Graziadei & Smith eds., 2017).
99. Qijing Yang (杨其静), Fenquan, Zengzhang yu Bugongping (分权, 增长
与不公平) [Separation of Power, Growth and Inequality], 4 (世界经济) [WORLD
ECON.] 102, 106 (2010).
100. DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE
ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY AND POVERTY 437–38 (2013).
101. See, e.g., Joseph P.H. Fan et al., Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment: China Versus the Rest of the World, 37 WORLD DEV. 852 (2009) (arguing that China has a quality government that promotes foreign direct investment).
102. Acemoglu & Robinson, supra note 100, at 437–38.
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from the central government’s selective enforcement. 103 The
neglected part of the story is that the Changzhou government
had facilitated Tieben’s expansion by expropriating a considerable amount of land from farmers and transferring it to Tieben,
in violation of central government regulations. 104 Having lost
their land and shelter, many farmers were reduced to living in
abandoned boats and cement pipes. 105 Local government officials had in fact been so eager to expropriate rural land on Tieben’s behalf, in order to make it the top steel company in Asia,
that they had exceeded the company’s original request for approximately 2000 mu of land, or 329 acres, by approximately
3988 mu, or 656 acres.106 It was thus with the Changzhou government’s hearty endorsement, encouragement, and full support that Tieben decided to expand its operations. 107 Why did
local officials in Changzhou behave in this manner? Because of
competitive pressure from neighboring cities. Changzhou had
been ranked the lowest in economic growth of the three main
cities in southern Jiangsu province—Suzhou, Wuxi, and
Changzhou—although two decades before the three cities had
enjoyed roughly the same level of economic development. 108
Changzhou government officials thus considered Tieben’s expansion an opportunity to turn the situation around.109 If the
central government had not selected Tieben as an example to
signal to the whole country that the steel industry was experiencing a bubble that needed to be burst, the company’s—and
local government officials’—plan would likely have succeeded,
at least in the short run. Regardless of the outcome, the major
cost was borne by the farmers who lost their land.
Chinese local governments can be considered as “super
growth machines,” and exhibit two major characteristics: they
are (1) development-oriented and (2) conducive to power103. Junjie Li ( 李 军 杰 ) & Weifeng Zhou ( 周 卫 峰 ), Jiyu Zhengfujian
Jingzheng de Difang Zhengfu Jingji Xingwei Fenxi: Yi Tieben Shijian Weili (基
于政府间竞争的地方政府经济行为分析——以 “铁本事件” 为例) [Analysis on the
Economical Behavior of Local Governments Based on Competitions Between
Governments—Based on the Example of “ Tieben Case”], 1 (经济社会体制比较
页) [COMP. SOC. & ECON. SYS.] 51 (2005).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.; Chinese Weights and Measures, CHINASAGE, http://www.chinasage
.info/measures.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2018) (explaining China’s standard of
weights and measures).
107. Li & Zhou, supra note 103.
108. Id. at 51–52.
109. Id.
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business alliances. 110 Sociologists Harvey Molotch and John
Logan offer the most vivid formulation of the term growth machine, arguing that urban politics and policy-making are dominated by a coalition of businesspeople and various “politically
mobilized local elites” who are united in their shared interest in
economic growth. 111 The central government has granted city
and county governments across the country a great deal of autonomy to manage their own economies, thereby encouraging
competition among them. Economic growth means the transfer
of resources from lower- to higher-productivity sectors or, more
specifically in the case of China, the transfer of land from agricultural use to industrial use; this, in turn, has fueled China’s
fast-paced industrialization and urbanization over the past
three decades.112 The imbalance in the allocation of tax authority also renders local governments reliant on land to finance
their operations.113
Moreover, within local government jurisdictions, mobile
capital often has a louder voice than immobile land interests.
That is not to say that capital and land cannot be integrated.
Investors can, and often do, hold land rights, and real estate
developers are also powerful players in Chinese cities.114 However, we need to distinguish between individual land rights and
the property rights of big business interests. In China, individuals do not have voting rights, and thus cannot decide who the
next mayor of their city will be, and their participation in local
governments is quite limited. 115 They can protest, but protests
jeopardize governance only when they accumulate to a certain
scale. Individual property-rights holders, be they farmers or
urban housing owners, enjoy much less mobility than investors.
Farmers cannot sell their land, even if they choose to work in
another locale. Urban housing owners have slightly more freedom, in that they can select the city in which they buy, but
housing choices are generally secondary to job choices. 116 For
most citizens, moving to a new city is a life-changing event, and
110. Wendell Pritchett & Shitong Qiao, Exclusionary Megacities, 91 S. Cal.
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 10).
111. See Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place, 82 AM. J. SOC. 309, 310–14 (1976).
112. Qiao & Upham, supra note 98, at 312–13.
113. Qiao, supra note 22, at 103.
114. Pritchett & Qiao, supra note 110, at 28.
115. Id. at 25–26.
116. Within a city, parents also consider the quality of the public school
district. See Been, supra note 2, at 523.
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it is therefore very costly to exercise the right to exit in protest
over local government policies.
Theoretically, real estate developers can be seen as a proxy
for housing consumers: the weakening of individual property
rights exerts a negative impact on housing demand and prices,
and therefore induces real estate developers to lobby local governments on behalf of housing consumers. 117 However, there
are two main problems with this view. First, the proxy is imperfect at best, as developers do not experience uncertainty in
the same way that consumers do.118 Even if we take developers
as proxy for housing consumers, there is a significant agency
cost involved. 119 Second, and more importantly in the Chinese
context, the interests of developers and individual property
owners often conflict because the former do not buy land from
the latter, as in the United States, but rather rely on the government to expropriate land from individuals. 120 The result is
an alliance between local governments and real estate developers, which profit from expropriating land at low prices and then
selling the houses built thereon at multiple times the cost of
land and construction. Therefore, developers benefit more from
weak individual rights than they lose from the theoretically
possible shrinkage of housing demand and prices. 121
Lastly, incomplete property rights in both rural and urban
China provide local governments with incentives to grab land
from individual property owners. Under Chinese law since the
1998 LAL revision, local governments enjoy monopoly power to
convert rural land to urban land and from agricultural use to
manufacturing use. 122 They do so by expropriating land from
farmers, whose compensation is calculated by the land’s agricultural value, which is much lower than its value for industrial or other urban uses.123 In other words, although rural land is
collectively owned in China, if we examine the bundle of sticks
of collectively owned rural land, the most valuable stick, the
right to develop the land, belongs to local governments rather
117. Id. at 529–33.
118. Epstein, supra note 9, at 154–59.
119. The author thanks Professor Richard Epstein for this point.
120. Qiao, supra note 22, at 93–95.
121. Theoretically property rights abuses will discourage a potential property buyer and their costs will be negatively capitalized in property sales prices if those abuses become widely known. See Ellickson, supra note 2, at 762–
63 n.66.
122. Qiao, supra note 22, at 98–103.
123. Id.
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than to farmers or their collectives. Local governments can capitalize on that stick only by expropriating land from farmers.
As a result, they have huge incentives to do so; otherwise, the
development value of rural land would be left unrealized.
C. WHAT KIND OF COMPETITION: SORTING OR AGGLOMERATION?
Before we apply market logic to understand government
behavior, we need to understand the logic of market competition. There are two kinds of markets: one is matching, which is
a win-win process, and the other is winner-takes-all.124
The Tiebout model and market-preserving federalism assume the former: individuals and firms move among local governments to take advantage of public policies that match their
preferences, just like ordinary consumers look around for a
seller who is willing to provide a particular service or product
at a price both parties can agree upon. 125 However, both the
market of places and market of politics fall into the winnertakes-all model in which a few places or local politicians become nationwide winners by successfully gaining national attention and agglomerating resources nationwide. Leading economists across the ideological spectrum have developed a field
called agglomeration economics, the basic claim of which is that
individuals and businesses make location decisions based on
where other individuals and businesses have decided to locate. 126 By locating themselves near specific others, individuals
and businesses can benefit from reduced transportation costs
for goods, capture information spillovers, and participate in
larger and more specialized labor and consumption markets. 127
Agglomeration benefits can outweigh preferences for particular
policies in the location decisions of both individuals and investors. 128 Agglomeration economics explain why individual citizens and investors choose to remain in New York, Silicon Val-

124. See, e.g., Kristian Behrens & Frederic Robert-Nicoud, Survival of the
Fittest in Cities: Agglomeration, Polarization, and Income Inequality, IDEAS
Working Paper, http://ideas.repec.org/p/lvl/lacicr/0919.html; Mark Hulbert,
Investing in a “Winner Takes All” Economy, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 9, 2017), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/investing-in-a-winner-takes-all-economy-1491790561.
125. David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1507, 1507–13 (2010).
126. Id. at 1509–10.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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ley, Shanghai, or Beijing despite their unaffordable housing,
traffic congestion, and bad (or even exclusionary) policies.129
Now put yourself in the shoes of the mayor of a mediumsized Chinese city, assuming that you are still decades from retirement and eager for a promotion. Think about the pyramid
structure of China’s bureaucratic system: on average, a city has
about eight to nine counties within its jurisdiction,130 a province has over a dozen cities, and there are 31 provinces in China. 131 Hence, the odds of a local leader being promoted to the
next bureaucratic level are low, and, among a dozen or more
peers, only one or two will win the promotion competition. This
is not a matching process, but rather one in which just one or
two winners will be chosen in each round. Economic development, as measured by gross domestic product (GDP), is a key
criterion in the evaluation and promotion of local government
leaders in China, and urbanization and industrialization have
been the driving forces behind the country’s impressive economic development.132 Think about Shenzhen, a shining model
of industrialization and urbanization that, over the course of
less than forty years, has been transformed from an agricultural county with about 300,000 farmers and fishermen into the
fourth largest city in China with over eighteen million people,133 and garnered a reputation as China’s Silicon Valley. 134
So, as mayor, what are you going to do? You want to turn your
129. Id.; see also Pritchett & Qiao, supra note 110, at 36; David Schleicher,
City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1673–95 (2013).
130. This is different from the United States, in which a county is generally
larger than a city.
131. See Xu, supra note 3, at 1084.
132. Yonggang Li (李勇刚), Bo Gao (高波) & Chunzhao Xu, (许春招), Jinsheng Jili, Tudi Caizheng yu Jingji Zengzhang de Quyu Chayi: Jiyu Mianban
Shuju Lianli Fangcheng de Guji (晋升激励, 土地财政与经济增长的区域差异—基
于面板数据联立方程的估计) [The Regional Difference on Promotion Incentives,
Land Finance and Economic Growth—an Analysis Based on Panel Data Simultaneous Equations], 1 ( 产 业 经 济 研 究 ) [INDUSTRY ECON. RES.] 100, 110
(2013); Lian Zhou (周黎安), Zhongguo Difang Guanyuan de Jinsheng Jinbiaosai Moshi Yanjiu (中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究) [An Analysis of Promotion Tournament Model of Chinese Local Officials], 7 (经济研究) [J. ECON.
RES] 36, 50 (2007).
133. Eli MacKinnon, The Twilight of Shenzhen’s Great Urban Village,
FOREIGN POL’Y MAG. (Sept. 16, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/16/
china-demolition-economy-the-twilight-of-shenzhens-great-urban-village
-baishizhou.
134. Shenzhen Is a Hothouse of Innovation: Copycats Are Out, Innovators
Are In, ECONOMIST (Apr. 8, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/special
-report/21720076-copycats-are-out-innovators-are-shenzhen-hothouse
-innovation.

2018]

RIGHTS-WEAKENING FEDERALISM

1697

city into another Shenzhen, full of investors and skyscrapers, or
at least into a mini-Shenzhen in your region. In any case, you
want to attract enough investment for economic development.
However, you must never forget that your peers and competitors in the region’s other cities have the same goals, and investment is scarce and must be agglomerated in a particular
place to generate benefits.
Industrial investment brings GDP growth with little time
lag. 135 For local leaders whose terms are, on average, about
four to five years, assigning land to investors in their first two
years in office can equate to GDP growth in the next two to
three years, regardless of whether those investors’ enterprises
are successful in the long run. 136 This also gives city leaders an
incentive to take land for industrial development. This type of
political competition is a race to the bottom owing to China’s
pyramid bureaucratic structure, wherein a local leader’s
chances of promotion are based on his or her performance relative to that of his or her peers in competing cities rather than
on his or her absolute performance. Although other factors such
as political connections also play a role, a city leader cannot
risk losing the economic competition. Scholars have compiled
empirical evidence demonstrating the correlation between industrial land assignment and the promotion of city leaders. 137
Leaders need to attract as much industrial investment as possible, certainly more than their peers in other cities, which
means that the amount of investment needed and the conditions under which it is attracted are determined neither by real
societal demand nor the specific situation of their cities, but rather by the amount of investment and conditions competing cities are offering. The result is that city leaders compete with one
another on the amount of land (usually oversupplied) and price
of land (often much lower than a well-functioning market
would offer) they assign to industrial investors.
The nature of agglomeration economies ensures that interjurisdictional competition among Chinese local governments is
not a win-win game, but rather a race to the bottom for most.
135. Qijing Yang (杨其静) & Yanqiong Peng (彭艳琼), Jinsheng Jingzheng
yu Gongye Yongdi Churang: Jiyu 2007–2011 nian Zhongguo Chengshi Mianban Shuju de Fenxi (晋升竞争与工业用地出让——基于 2007–2011 年中国城市面
板数据的分析) [Promotion Competition and the Transfer of Industrial Land—
an Analysis Based on the Panel Data of Chinese Cities from 2007 to 2011],
9 (经济理论与经济管理) [ECON. THEORY & ECON. MGMT] 5, 17 (2015).
136. Id.
137. Id.
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Local governments, in their role as landlords, are willing to
grant land at low prices (or even for free) to industrial investors. They hope that the resulting industrial development will
not only generate tax revenue, which is to be shared with the
central government, but also positive spillover effects, namely,
development of the commercial and service sectors, which in
turn generate business tax, 100% of which goes to local governments. 138 Manufacturing enterprises can agglomerate people in a certain area. Population flows into a city generate demand for housing and push up housing prices, which relates to
an important motivation for local governments: land sale revenues. Local governments control 100% of land-sale revenues. 139
From 2000 to 2012, local governments accrued total revenue of
160 trillion yuan, a larger sum than all local taxes combined.140
The foregoing economic-development model makes use of
the agglomeration effect of industrial development. It is true
that local governments in China can internalize the costs and
benefits of industrial development because they monopolize the
land supply. 141 The model also works for a few cities, represented by Shenzhen in the Pearl River Delta and Suzhou in the
Yangtze River Delta. However, the distribution effect of agglomeration has not received sufficient attention. Not every
small county can grow into a big city like Shenzhen. Agglomeration means that industries and economic activities are, in the
long run, concentrated in a few large cities.142 Assume that ten
counties are competing with one another for industrial investment in the expectation that it will boost commercial and service activities and, consequently, housing prices. In the long
run, however, only one or two will be successful in drawing suf138. Yisheng Xu (徐以升) & Lin Wang (王琳), Juzhu Yongdi Xique de
Huangdi Xinzhuang: Fang Renmin Daxue Guojia Fazhan Yanjiuyuan
Fuyuanzhang Tao Ran (居住用地稀缺的 “皇帝新装”—访人民大学国家发展研究院
副院长陶然) [Take Off the “Emperor ’s New Clothes” on the Scarcity of Residential Land: An Interview with Ran Tao], 5 (新华月报) [XINHUA MONTHLY] 17, 20
(2014).
139. Since the public finance reform in 1994, land-sale revenues do not
need to be submitted to the central government and are retained by the local
government in full. See, e.g., Li, Gao & Xu, supra note 132; Li Zhang (张莉),
Xianbin Wang (王贤彬), & Xianxiang Xu (徐现祥), Caizheng Jili, Jinsheng Jili
yu Difang Guanyuan de Tudi Churang Xingwei (财政激励, 晋升激励与地方官员
的土地出让行为) [Finance Encouragement, Promotion Encouragement and the
Land Sale Behavior of Local Officials], 4 (中国工业经济) [CHINESE INDUS.
ECON. ] 35, 43 (2011).
140. Xu & Wang, supra note 138.
141. Id.
142. Schleicher, supra note 125.
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ficient investment and population to their jurisdictions to generate agglomeration effects. The rest will be losers in the competition game. At the outset, each competitor will reduce prices
below what they would be in an isolated jurisdiction in the
hopes of winning the game because its offering price depends
on those of its competitors. In other words, a city government’s
decision to assign industrial land to an investor depends not
only on its land-expropriation cost and the direct tax revenue
the investor will pay, but also on the industrial investment’s
potential spillover effect on residential housing prices, as well
as whether it can win the interjurisdictional competition to
generate agglomeration effects. However, owing to the nature
of agglomeration, most cities will lose the competition. This
race-to-the-bottom competition among Chinese local governments constitutes the prisoner’s dilemma.
Without competitive pressure, local governments would
likely have granted land to investors at higher prices than in
the real world. At present, industrial land prices are often only
a tenth of residential land prices, or even lower. 143 For example, in Hangzhou, the average industrial land price in 2009 was
483 yuan per square meter, whereas that for residential land
was 1526 yuan per square meter.144 Numerous studies have revealed that local governments commonly assign industrial land
to investors at prices lower than the costs of expropriation and
building infrastructure. 145 A former director of the Jiangsu
Provincial Bureau of Land Administration puts it this way:
Industrial land has grown very quickly in Jiangsu, but all towards
similar industries and repeated constructions happen a lot; development zones are everywhere and vicious competition on the basis of offering land at lower prices, even publicly offering zero-price land, is
triggering land occupation and waste. 146

143. Bai Xue (薛白), Caizheng Fenquan, Zhengfu Jingzheng yu Tudi Jiage
Jiegouxing Pianli (财政分权 、政府竞争与土地价格结构性偏离) [Separation of
Financial Powers, Government Competition and the Structural Deviation of the
Land Price], 3 (财经科学) [FIN. & ECON.] 49, (2011).
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Qingyong Zhang ( 张清勇), Difang Zhengfu Jingzheng yu
Gongye Yongdi Churang Jiage (地方政府竞争与工业用地出让价格) [Local Government Competition and the Price of Industrial Land Transfer], (中国制度经济
学年会精选论文 (第一部分) [CHINA INSTITUTIONAL ECON. ANN. CONF. SELECTIONS] at 299 (2005); Qijing Yang (杨其静), Pin Zhuo (卓品) & Jidong Yang (杨
继东), Gongye Yongdi Churang yu Yinzi Zhiliang Dixian Jingzheng (工业用地
出让与引资质量底线竞争—基于 2007–2011 年中国地级市面板数据的经验研究)
[Transfer of Industrial Land and Race to the Bottom in Attracting Investment:
An Empirical Study], 11 (管理世界) [MGMT. WORLD] 24, 34 (2014).
146. Zhang, supra note 145, at 299.
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Economists have studied the supply of cheap industrial
land, and lawyers have examined local government abuses of
expropriation power, but rarely have scholars examined the
connections between them systematically. A few have connected the prevalence of land expropriation with the huge gap between residential land prices and rural land compensation, but
most expropriated rural land is turned over to industrial rather
than residential development. 147 Local government competition
for industrial capital is the main cause of the prevalent land
expropriation witnessed in China.
III. THE CONUNDRUM FOR AUTHORITARIAN
FEDERALISM: CENTRALIZATION OR
DECENTRALIZATION?
This Article asks and answers the question of whether local governments provide stronger or weaker property rights
protection than the national government and why. More specifically, it queries the divergence between national law and local
practices in the eminent domain arena. My answer to the first
question is that local governments take much more land than
national law allows, rig national law, and create their own
mechanisms of eminent domain that go against national law.
My answer to the second question, why local governments provide weaker property-rights protection, is that interjurisdictional competition for economic development motivates local
governments to take more land than national law permits.
Hence, such competition does weaken individual land rights.
Assuming that you care about individual rights in China,
the observation of rights-weakening federalism does not necessarily lead to advocacy for centralization. The widespread illegal takings by local governments, which run contrary to the national authority’s efforts to construct a centralized and unified
system of property-rights protection, point to the failures of
centralization, but certainly do not put decentralization forward as the solution. After all, it is interjurisdictional competition that has worsened the protection of individual rights. This
is the paradox of authoritarian federalism. The two components
of the term are in conflict: authoritarianism emphasizes authority and demands centralization, whereas federalism conventionally cries out for decentralization and local autonomy.
This internal tension or conflict speaks to the China paradox—
147. Id.
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the national government wants to control local governments
but fails to do so because of information and administrative
costs, meaning that local governments have actually become
more powerful than and have a larger national impact than
their counterparts in democratic countries. This Chinese style
of federalism, or authoritarian federalism, is however inherently unstable. The more power local governments gain, the less
control the national government retains, and vice versa. Losing
too much control on either side seems to be a bad idea. When
the national government loses control, local governments compete to take land from farmers, which jeopardizes the national
public good of social stability. At the same time, when local
governments lose their autonomy, the national government
fails to govern effectively or develop the economy efficiently.
Centralization or decentralization? If it seems hard to
choose, it is probably because that we have asked a wrong
question. As Professors Jonathan Rodden and Susan RoseAckerman write:
An MPF would have to resemble a layer cake, with each distinct layer
of government linked only by frosting, rather than a marble cake, in
which the layers are swirled together. Jurisdictional lines separating
levels of government in modern federal systems are rarely so welldefined, and it is usually a mistake to view any jurisdictional unit as
autonomous. 148

Chinese local governments’ manipulation of national property
laws, including a relevant constitutional clause, testifies to the
above argument that the jurisdictional lines separating various
levels of government are rarely well-defined. What matters is
not to delineate a clear boundary between national and local
power, but the dynamic and pattern of national-local interactions. By providing a taxonomy of illegality in national-local interactions in the Chinese land-rights arena, this Article attempts to pierce the structure of authoritarian federalism and
identify the patterns of the national and local authorities’ interactions with each other.
The next step is finding a way to reform authoritarian federalism. Here, I make a start. The failure of national law within rights-weakening federalism originates from the numbers;
that is, a single national authority cannot overcome the huge
information and administration costs involved in micromanaging several thousand local-government units. However, there
are ways to beat the numbers, for example, by mobilizing and
148. Rodden & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 3, at 1527.
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empowering individual citizens to monitor the local governments that are violating individual rights. Such mobilization
and empowerment can be effected in two ways: first, through
the judiciary, granting individual citizens access to challenge
local governments in national courts to defend national laws;
second, through local governance reform, thereby increasing
both the voice and exit power of individual citizens. 149

149. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & Shitong Qiao, Voice and Exit as Accountability Mechanisms: Can Foot-Voting Be Made Safe for the Chinese Communist Party?, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 158, 158 (2016).

